All posts by Gerhard_Mangott

Zorn, der keine Erkenntnis bringt

January 25, 2007 Gerhard_Mangott 29 Comments

Bernd Marin – sociologist – in two op-eds has criticized talking to Iran on nuclear issues in scientific circles let alone engage that country in a long-term perspective. He attacked those who promote these strategies as either fools or collaborators (excerpts of Marins comment are published below my op-ed). Find below my response in an op-ed exclusively published by the Austrian daily ‘Der Standard’ on January 25th, 2007.

Mit heiligem Zorn stürzt sich Bernd Marin in die Debatte über die Schrecknisse eines nuklearen Iran; dabei ist doch bekannt, daß der Zorn der Erkenntnis zumeist im Wege steht; vor allem dann, wenn dieser sich aus jenem entlädt, der in sicherheitspolitischen Debatten bislang unbekannt war. Sich dem Dialog zu verweigern macht zwar nicht taub, aber dumm – denn dann bleibt der sozialwissenschaftliche Denker Gefangener seiner Ahnungen und Vorurteile, vielleicht auch seiner moralischen Gewissheiten, ohne zumindest zu erahnen, wie jene denken, die wir zurecht als bedrohlich, fanatisiert und gewaltbereit begreifen müssen.

Die nuklearen Begehrlichkeiten des Iran sind zwar nicht bewiesen, dennoch lassen die Anzeichen der Täuschung, der Tarnung und des Verbergens Zweifel, Misstrauen und Vorsicht aufkommen. Kaum noch lässt sich leugnen, dass das islamische Regime zumindest die nukleare Option anstrebt – um damit aber noch immer der massiven nuklearen Bewaffnung seiner Nachbarn Indien, Pakistan und Israel nachzuhinken.

Auch ist zu erahnen, dass eine nukleare Bewaffung Irans, die nukleare Option für Saudi Arabien, Ägypten, Syrien und der Türkei zwingend macht. Ganz sicher auch ist im demokratisch regierten Israel der Einsatz nuklearer Macht nur das letzte Mittel zur Verteidigung. Dasselbe kann von dem autoritären Regime in Iran leider nicht angenommen werden.

Dennoch ist es für die sozialwissenschaftliche Debatte unerlässlich, die Denkstrukturen, die Motive und Absichten derer zu erfahren, deren Gegnerschaft man fürchtet. Ziel ist dabei nicht, sich diesen anzudienen, zu verharmlosen oder gar – wie Marin schändlich unterstellt – zu kollaborieren.

Aber die Erforschung von Motivlagen und Perzeptionen zählt zu den grundlegenden Bausteinen sicherheitspolitischer Analyse. Vielleicht mag dies den Männern des heiligen Zorns und der festen Überzeugung zu mühsam oder gar als unnotwendig erscheinen. Wer sich dieser Mühen der Erkenntnis aber entzieht, fällt der Leichtigkeit des ideologischen Urteils und der verzerrten Deutung zum Opfer.

Überzeugungen sollten Erkenntnissen nicht im Weg stehen. Natürlich ist nicht zu bestreiten, dass Achmadi-nejad totalitären Wahnideen anhängt und vermutlich davon auch überzeugt ist. Es ist aber unrichtig zu leugnen, dass ihm mit Rafsandjani, Chamenei und Larijani andere Machtzentren entgegenstehen und ihn einhegen.

Hätte Iran eine nukleare Waffe, würde diese zweifellos nicht in den Händen des totalitären Eiferers landen. Auch ein nuklear bewaffneter Iran wird dadurch nicht zwangsläufig zum regionalen Aggressor.

Die nukleare Bewaffnung Irans gilt es dennoch, wenn möglich, zu verhindern – das Risiko nuklearer Rüstungseskalation kann zu gross werden, der Aufbau der strategischen Kultur der wechselseitigen Abschreckung ist keineswegs zwingend erreichbar, somit nukleare Erstschläge nicht undenkbar. Dazu gilt es, viele denkbare Möglichkeiten einzusetzen: harte, aber auch intelligente Sanktionen, die das nukleare Entwicklungsprogramm erschweren und verlangsamen können, ohne aber damit zwingend die aufgewühlte Bevölkerungsmehrheit im Taumel nationaler Geschlossenheitsbezeugungen hinter dem fanatisierten Gewaltrhetoriker zu sammeln.

Verhandlungen sind aber ebenso unabdingbar, und es wäre wohl besser, diese ohne Vorbedingungen zu beginnen. Wer in Unterredungen den anderen zu Zugeständnissen bewegen will, darf von ihm nicht vorher verlangen, sein Gesicht zu verlieren. Militärische Luftschläge aber, die Marin anmahnt, sind das geistige Spielzeug derer, die in der Flamme des Krieges das beste Instrument zur Lösung nahöstlicher Verstrickungen sehen; wer darin verbrennen wird, ist in den Landstrichen zwischen Basra, Faluja und Bagdhad jeden Tag neu zu sehen. Bernd Marin sollte sich in die unzähligen Studien vertiefen, in denen die Untauglichkeit militärischer Präzisionsschläge nachgewiesen, die unermessliche militärische, humane und wirtschaftliche Eskalation einer Bodeninvasion durchleuchtet wird.

Wenn die Alternative die militärische Verwüstung des Iran ist, ohne auch dessen nukleares Wissen zu vernichten; wenn die militärische Verheerung den Weg zur iranischen Atombombe nur länger, aber nicht unbegehbar machte, sollte besser darüber nachgedacht werden, ob die iranische nukleare Bewaffnung akzeptiert und in einem regionalen Sicherheitssystem ausbalanciert werden kann.

Nach der Gewalt zu rufen, um Bedrohungen zu beseitigen, ist gerade dann eigenartig, wenn man diese durch Marins Gesprächs-, Denk- und Verhandlungsverweigerung gar nicht richtig versteht. Der Zorn darf nicht blind machen – auch wenn er angeblich heilig ist.

My comment was written in response to two op-eds of Bernd Marin. The main messages of these comments:

‘(….) Will oder kann man nicht verstehen: Politiker, deren Realitätssinn und Wahrheitsliebe sich am “historischen Ereignis Holocaust” zeigt, wie sie sich zeigt, die feindselig das “zionistische Gebilde” Israel “tilgen” wollen – mit Repräsentanten eines solchen Regimes trotzig ihre “friedliche” Atompolitik diskutieren anstatt sie zu boykottieren, das ist für alle, die die Erde nicht für flach und die Shoah oder 9/11 nicht für eine jüdische Weltverschwörung halten, irgendwie unfassbar.

Welcher Mensch bei Sinnen kann Friedensbeteuerungen solcher Realitätsleugner irgendeinen Glauben schenken? Oder Verhandlungen mit ihnen – ohne massive Sanktionsdrohungen – für sinnvoll halten?

(…)

Nur nützliche Idioten und Komplizen diskutieren Frieden mit Hitler, die “Rassenfrage” mit dem Apartheid-, und Atompolitik mit dem Mullah-Regime.

Denn islamistisch-faschistische Staaten, die Holocaustleugnung und Opferverhöhnung vom Präsidenten abwärts von Amts wegen betreiben, Terror fördern und anderen UN-Mitgliedern mit Auslöschung drohen, müssen mit allen, wirklich allen Mitteln bekämpft werden, juristischen, politischen, gesellschaftlichen, diplomatischen – und wenn nötig selbstverständlich auch militärischen.

Andernfalls würde die bittere Karikatur Wirklichkeit werden, in der Ahmadi-Nejad flammend ausruft “There is no Holocaust . . .” und auf einer zweiten Seite die Rede fortsetzend hinzufügt “. . . yet”.

Ob das mit friedlichen Mitteln allein noch zu verhindern ist, wird sich erst zeigen müssen.’

(DER STANDARD-Printausgabe, 22.1.2007)

The full text of Marins comments can be downloaded from http://www.euro.centre.org/detail_people.php?xml_id=83

NATO

NATO – post mortem

January 18, 2007 Gerhard_Mangott 8 Comments

NATO as an alliance has lost its raison-d’être. This is not due to a lack of common security threats NATO allies are facing but to a striking lack of common threat perception, the lack of a stable consensus on how to deal with threats if at all accepted as common and, finally, appalling buck passing when it comes to war fighting by many European softliners.

The striking and growing differences in military capabilities of NATO’s members undermine alliance coherence. What sense does it make for the strong, well-armed countries to committ to the security of others who obviously do not care enough for their own security and prefer instead to rely on the security umbrella provided by the strong alliance members?

This is even more awkward as the weak and impotent do share the same voice within the alliance as the strong and powerful. Voice without committment, a seat at the table without boots on the ground is a recipe for desaster but not for success.

It is time for reconsidering NATO. In fact this has already started years ago, with the US increasingly abandoning the alliance as the core instrument of US security and military policy beyond the european theatre. Institutionalised security and defense collaboration does make sense only as long as all members of the alliance are committed to both rights and obligations. This consensus has well whithered away long ago.

Why should the US and the UK engage with the French and the Germans who either balk at them, brazenly soft-balance them with the Russians or ask for the job at the low end of war fighting.

It is time for openly and vociferously accepting coalitions of the willing and the capable as the more effective, flexible, coherent and legitimate instruments of security provision. This should prod more of the lame and the mean to reconsider their status and either go it alone or restart working for the common alliance purpose.

If the Germans are fighting their wars more in the Bundestag on troop mandates than in the hot spots of Afghanistan let them do. If the French are engaging in yet another effort of balancing the US keep them out. If the Spanish are engaged in negotiating a separate truce with terror leave them alone. The incompetent, the impotent and the ignorant deserve to be dumped.

US Leadership

Iraq: Surge and Conquer

January 11, 2007 Gerhard_Mangott 4 Comments

Iraq is not about democracy. Despite democratic globalist’s emphasis on US moral obligations to spread democracy globally even by military means it is time to return to a realist perspective and start defending US and allied powers’ vital interests. Democracy does not work in current Iraq and democratizing this country should have never been of any concern to the US. Had realist motivations prevailed in 2003 the US would never have intervened in Iraq militarily in the first place.

However, it is idle to lament on the Bush-43 decision to wage this war of choice back in 2003. The only thing that counts now is how to entangle allied forced from the Iraqi quagmire resulting both from a terrorist insurgency and a sectarian civil war. In both these processes external powers like Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are deeply involved. The Shiite led Maliki government is both unable and unwilling to reign in the Shiite militias (particularly those of Muqtada Sadr, on which his government currently depends). Maliki’s commitment to reconciliation is weak; it is even questionable if he really supports the idea of a multisectarian Iraq. Shiite dominance may be more to his liking; US military control is therefore considered hampering these efforts. Sunni engagement in Iraqi politics therefore is highly limited and even if Maliki’s efforts were more serious it is highly unlikely that most of the Sunni tribes could be engaged in a viable coalition government.

Reconstruction of the Iraqi economy and infrastructure is slow. This is due to incompetence, corruption, poor planning and the fact that many countries do not live up to the financial committments for rebuilding war-torn Iraq they had previously made.

On the face of it, it seems prudent to withdraw allied forces from Iraq. The inevitable consequence however would be an escalating sectarian struggle, an all-out civil war forcing or inviting neighbouring countries to back the warring parties; central government would collapse, the country most likely disintegrate and Iraq’s neighbours occupy parts of the collapsing Iraq. This would however not end in an equilibrium with the invaders saturated with parts of Iraqi territory but would lead to military clashes between the invading armies.

Furthermore a dismembering Iraq would boost islamist terrorist activity of the al-Khaida type. Both an escalating war in the region and the formation of terrorist cells gaining sufficient strength to wage terrorist attacks against allied countries directly threaten vital security interests of the US and its allies. Withdrawing from Iraq is not like leaving Saigon; it would be like abandoning the decision to invade the Normandie in 1944.

The allies therefore must not leave. A surge of armed forces is a highly reasonable decision albeit coming excessively late. However, the reinforcement numbers suggested by President Bush are far too low. With the US army already overstretched realist thinking should urge reluctant European governments to assist the allied powers with additional military reinforcements. Clearing and holding section by section in Baghdad making use of overwhelming numbers of troops is of utmost importance.

This surge however needs to be combined with massive investment to boost economic rebuilding; economic recovery is aimed to provide the ordinary Iraqis with jobs in order to decrease their hostility toward the allied forces.

Widely discussed benchmarks for the Maliki government will most likely not work as it becomes increasingly clear that the Shiite groups stand to profit from a US withdrawal. Allied powers need to dump Maliki and press for a different government – a moderate coalition of Shiites, Sunni and Kurds. This needs to be pursued even if it meant violating the existing constitution or dissolving parliament.

Allied forces should stop democratising Iraq but stabilise and control all the levers of power. The Iraqi quagmire does not call for democracy but for occupation, leadership and military control combined with concerted rebuilding efforts. If the people of Iraq are not able to govern, sustain and defend their country as ‘Iraqis’, external interference is more than necessary. Granting power to one sect tempts it to wield unlimited power. Keeping Sunnis and Shiite off power might cause them reconsider their situation. If prolonged occupation by foreign forces and UN civil administration within the framework of an UN protectorate might foster an Iraqi identity and desire to regain freedom for all Iraqi ethnic and religious groups this might be worth a try. If they stand to regain a rebuilt country political resentments may dwindle.

This is a task for many years and requires political and financial commitments by an allied coalition far larger than the current one. This war is not about winning; this war is about not to lose. Allied powers simply can’t afford to lose.

US Leadership

The Fairy Tales of Multilateralism

December 29, 2006 Gerhard_Mangott 8 Comments

With the US tied down in the Iraqi quagmire, leftist intellectuals urge the US to abandon allegedly neocon unilateralism and return to concepts of multilateralism. Multilateralism is praised as a panacea for handling failing states, terrorism or proliferation. The op-eds are full with multilateral recipes for handling crises in all corners of the globe.

Those advocates however hardly ever define what they mean by multilateralism. Does their multilateralism call for consensus among the P-5, the veto-holding powers in the SC of the UN, as a noble principle or even force the US to achieving agreement among the P-5 at all cost? What this approach leads to has been illustrated most recently by the disastrous resolution on the Iranian nuclear programme adopted by the Security Council last week. After months of negotiating and back-pedaling, the US, the UK and France have agreed to resolution 1737 (2006) which will by all means will turn out to be utterly ineffective. Russian and Chinese balking resulted in a watered-down version which only causes laughter in Teheran. For the boasted purpose of preserving unanimity, the US and its European allies have accepted a meaningless compromise capable neither of dealing with the perseverant unanimity within the ranks of the veto powers, nor – more importantly – of addressing the Iranian menace in an appropriate manner.

Should multilateralism therefore mean aiming for widespread consensus outside of the framework of the SC? Well, the author is inclined to support such an alternative for the sake of effective approaches to handling threatening crises. But this is precisely not what the champions of effective multilateralism both in the EU and US congress like to adhere to, at least publicly. Yet these hypocritical advocates of international law tend to forget that only in 1999 many of them had supported the NATO air war against the FR of Yugoslavia, which – as we all know – was not authorized by the UN. So sometimes it obviously seems appropriate also for these multilateralists to abandon SC consensus for the sake of achieving humanitarian or interest-based outcomes in conflict cases. While I consider it right to sack legality for the sake of legitimacy in some cases, the multilateralists try hard to conceal their collusion with this approach back in 1999.

But even if we were to subscribe to multilateralism and inclined to urge the US to return to multilateralist approaches to international crises we have to answer one crucial question: Are there any reliable European partners for multilateral bargains with the US except for the UK? France, Germany and Russia have all rejected US calls for support and help in dealing with the Iraqi crisis in 2002/2003. Even if we were to concede that the military intervention by the US and the UK in Iraq in 2003 was wrong, even if we were to agree that the planning for post-war rebuilding and re-organising Iraq have been utterly simplistic, there is one thing western powers have to agree too: it is in our vital interests to stabilise Iraq. We must not accept the dismemberment of Iraq which will end in a broad military conflict in the entire region. Europe and the US need an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself.

Most EU countries however prefer to sit on the fences and bark at the US; self-opinionated as they are, countries like Germany and France prefer to stick to the ‘we told you so’-position while irresponsibly denying any substantial help for the military stabilisation and the civil reconstruction of Iraq.

Multilateralism is indeed a valuable concept though not as the legalist construct of P-5 consensus. Relying on multilateralist approaches to international crises however requires leadership – which the US is to provide – and reliable partners. Most European countries do not live up to this at the moment. At the end of the day, the European mantra seems to be: We expect the US to lead and take the burden, and we will tell her when and where… and, by the way, don’t ask the EU to contribute to the effort militarily, she enjoys her peace dividend…

A commentary based on these arguments was published in German language exclusively by the Austrian Daily ‘Der Standard’ on December 30th, 2006:

Joschka Fischer mahnt also die Rückkehr der USA zum Multilateralismus an. Leider erklärt er nie, was er darunter versteht. Bedeutet Multilateralismus die Einbindung der hegemonialen Macht in den Konsens der kollektiven Ordnung der Vereinten Nationen? Meint Joschka Fischer denn, die USA sollten sich durch die Vetomächte des Sicherheitsrates – allen voran Rußland und China – einhegen lassen? Die jüngsten Fehlgeburten dieses Rates sind die zahnlosen Sanktionen gegen das islamistische Regime des Iran. Um den Eindruck des kollektiven, d.h. multilateralen Vorgehens, die auch von Fischer beschworene Geschlossenheit der internationalen Gemeinschaft zu bewahren, wurden substantielle Sanktionen unterlassen; der Multilateralismus hat ein dürres Gerippe an Verhaltensregeln ausgespuckt, das die Nuklearoption des reaktionären iranischen Regimes nicht verhindern wird.

Erstaunlich aber, sollte Fischer wirklich diesen Multilateralismus der VN einmahnen. Erinnerlich noch ist, als Deutschland unter Schröder und Fischer die – an sich richtige – NATO-Intervention im Kosovo unterstützten, die doch den völkerrechtlichen Multilateralismus des zwingend gebotenen Sicherheitsratsmandates verletzte. Sollten also nicht alle Vetomächte des Sicherheitsrates der VN zustimmen müssen, damit das heilige Prinzip des Multilateralismus gewahrt bleibt? Plädiert Fischer damit für den Multilateralismus weniger Staaten, der sich im Völkerrechtsgewand kleidet, wenn er den eigenen Interessen dient? Muss sich eine Staatenkoalition dem Völkerrecht nicht beugen, sobald sie glaubt, moralisch rechtens oder im zwingenden eigenen Interesse zu handeln? Wieder hätte Fischer damit recht, allein die Botschaft wäre ihm wohl unangenehm.

Und schließlich: ein solcherart verstandener Multilateralismus, der die Zusammenarbeit führender Mächte zur Lösung einer Gefahr auch jenseits des Mandats des Sicherheitsrates einschließt, ist stumpf, wenn die Bereitschaft der großen Staaten ausbleibt, unter der Führung der USA (die Fischer auch immer wieder anerkennt und geradezu einfordert) zusammenzuarbeiten. Multilateralismus braucht Partner. Die europäischen Partner haben sich aber gerade in der Irakkrise 2002/03 verweigert. Sie verweigern sich auch jetzt noch: Was immer man über die Richtigkeit der Entscheidung zur militärischen Intervention 2003 denken mag; was immer an der nicht ausreichenden Planung der Nachkriegsordnung auszusetzen ist; eines ist sicher: die Niederlage der USA im Irak und der Abzug der US-Streitkräfte aus dem Zweistromland würden die Region in eine verheerende Krise stürzen, die unmittelbar vitalste westliche, d.h. auch europäische Interessen erschütterte. Trotzdem bleiben die meisten europäischen Staaten auf der Zuschauertribüne und sonnen sich lieber in historischer Rechthaberei, als konkret zur Lösung der irakischen Zwangslage beizutragen. Multilateralismus ist ein taugliches Konzept – aber er braucht Partner. Führungsleistung einzumahnen, ohne zur Gefolgschaft bereit zu sein, ist nicht genug.

US Leadership

Iraq: Don’t cut and run but change course

December 20, 2006 Gerhard_Mangott 4 Comments

Iraq is much too important to Western interests to be abandoned. The US and its allies – and far too few countries consider themselves to be US allies with shared interests – must not give in to calls to weaken its presence in Iraq. The Baker Commission’s recommendations are playing to US public opinion which longs for a change of course in Iraq and a soon withdrawal of US troops. However, the Commission does not offer reasonable solutions to address the current Iraqi quagmire without abandoning vital interests.

Transferring security tasks to Iraqi forces and withdrawing combat brigades to camps within Iraq or outside is highly illusive and will not work. It is highly unlikely that Iraqi military and police forces will be able to quell both terrorist cells, Sunni insurgency and sectarian strife and killings. The Iraqi forces are infiltrated by sectarian militias and do not reflect Iraqi interests but those of ethnic and religious tribes. Furthermore, the Iraqi military is under-equipped, under-funded and not sufficiently trained. In addition, the Maliki-Government is both unwilling and unable to strengthen its grip on the military and demobilise the sectarian militias.

The second main suggestion by the Baker Commission – to start talks with Syria and Iran about the stabilisation of Iraq – is futile as well. Both Syria and Iran will demand US returns for their help. These appeasement offers could be accepting Syria’s continued influence in Lebanon, pressing for negotiations between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights and starting negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme without any preconditions.

Furthermore, why should these rogue regimes help the US out of its current quagmire now that the US is utterly weak and dependent on outside support and assistance? The argument, that neither of the two is interested in the dismemberment of Iraq is true but not yet a factor pressing Iran and Syria to assist the US or the Iraqi government. As of today, they stand to gain more from prolonging the current state of affairs in Iraq. But even if these two countries would agree to help the US in stabilising Iraq it is far from certain that they would be able to deliver.

Strong US leadership should reject both ‘cut and run’ suggestions and ‘graceful exit’ recommendations. The US and its allies stand to lose strongly by the dismemberment of Iraq as this would invite or press neighbouring countries to intervene. An indirect, let alone a direct, confrontation in Iraq between Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran to get control of parts of Iraq is a scenario much too dangerous to western interests.

Europe needs to understand that the US must not lose in Iraq in order to forestall disastrous consequences for western interests. European allies – except for the UK – however lack courage, leadership and resoluteness to commit military forces and financial support for the stabilisation of Iraq. It is highly important to bolster western military presence in Iraq. This can not be done by the US military alone. US need European troops to help. If Europe does not respond it fails to understand its own vital interests.

Furthermore, it is futile to set strict and public benchmarks for the Maliki government. It is highly necessary to push Maliki to do a better job as Iraq’s leader, but not in public. It is, in addition, illusionary however, to expect the current Iraqi government to deliver results in due time and meet western expectations. It is far too weak for meeting these expectations.

Iraq needs more Western troops and increased financial commitments to rebuild the country. The true danger is, that the US is following the European lack of responsibility and opts for an allegedly graceful exit which is nothing more than the abandonment of vital security interests, the wrecking of western credibility and a major defeat in the military struggle against terrorism.

Russia

Litvinenko: The Alleged Iranian Trail and the Mossad

December 13, 2006 Gerhard_Mangott 3 Comments

Russian sources are now suggesting A. Litvinenko might have been involved in the smuggling of Polonium 210 to Iran. This is obviously farcical for two reasons:

First of all, this looks like an excellent public relations coup: Nothing else could shake Litvinenko’s credibility and appraisal in western public opinion more than his collusion with the alleged nuclear weapons programme of Iran. This rumour about Litvinenko’s smuggling is precisely meant to wreck his image. Is is furthered by leaked allegations of D. Kovtun that Litvinenko was in desperate need for money.

Secondly, the assumption Litvinenko was handling Polonium 210 without sufficient caution so as not to intoxicate himself does not go well with the allegedly high dose of intoxication of Litvinenko’s body. If the dose found in Litvinenko’s body in the autopsy was indeed 10-20 times higher than the lethal dose, he could have hardly inhaled it by accident.

Thirdly, Iran does not need Polonium 210 at the time. Given the half time of Polonium 210 of 138 days and the current state of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, the Iranians don’t need this substance now – apart from the fact that Polonium 210 is not a state of the art triggering substance for nuclear explosions. It is much more likely that the Polonium 210 should have or has already been handed over to Chechen terrorists. Berezovsky’s links to Chechen terrorists are notorious; Berezovsky, Litvinenko and Achmed Zakayev are members of the same anti-Putin camp in exile.

But even the dirty bomb explanation is hardly credible. Dirty bombs are based on conventional explosive devices spreading radioactive material. Polonium ist not the preferred radioactive material for such bombs – for it is expensive and has a very low half time.

Summing up, I do not consider the hypothesis of the smuggling-related toxication of Litvinenko to be the most credible and plausible one for his death.

It is intriguing though that the possible involvement of western security services in the killing of A. Litvinenko is not more widely discussed. There are definitely circles in western countries who are interested in damaging ties to Russia and stand to profit from it.

It could be theorised that the Israeli Mossad could have been involved in this drama. Israeli-Russian ties are strained. Israel is upset by Russian deliveries of air defense systems like the Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran and armament sales to Syria. The latter is particularly annoying for Israel as Russian weapons meant for Syria are illegaly transferred to Hezbollah in Lebanon – such as anti-tank missiles.

Besides, arch enemies of the Putin administration live in Israel today – particularly former owners of Menatep/Yukos, like Vladimir Dubov and Leonid Nevzlin. Both men have been feverishly interested in wrecking both Putin’s and Russia’s image.

Anti-Terrorism

Losing Afghanistan

December 11, 2006 Gerhard_Mangott 5 Comments

US and allied forces are about to lose Afghanistan: The anti-terror and anti-Taliban efforts as well as state- and institution building are bearing no sustainable fruit.

The democratic institution-building process initiated by the Petersberg Conference in 2002 has indeed initiated the build-up of state-institutions based on electoral choice by a vast majority of Afghan citizens. The current Karzai government however is fragmented, inefficient and torn by corruption. What is more, its authority is weak beyond Kabul and rests with rogue warlords in the provinces. Civic reconstruction is slow, under-funded and only partially directed. Infrastructure investment is far below desired levels and support for sustainable small- and medium sized enterprises is almost non-existent. Rural inhabitants’ reliance on drug-plants thus is reasonable and is all the more enforced on the locals by organised crime (most often linked to regional warlords) and islamist fighters. Co-operation between terrorist cells and organised crime is strong.

Western policies on Afghanistan lack vision and comprehensive efforts as well as financial commitment. The military operation within ISAF, less so in the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom, lacks sufficient personnel and equipment. The Taliban threat has increased over the past 14 months, particularly in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar; terrorist activities however are occuring also in other parts of Afghanistan. Allied troops are involved in fierce battles with brazen onslaughts by Taliban fighters. In this struggle allied fighters increasingly lack the support of the local population. The allies are losing the fight for the hearts of the Pashtun tribes in the south and the east of Afghanistan.

What is most threatening, however, is the build-up of large training camps of Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists in neighbouring Pakistan. The Musharraf-government is either unwilling or unable – most likely both – to prevent terrorists from controlling the Waziristan, Baluchistan and Bajaur provinces. Terrorists are constantly trespassing the borders to Afghanistan to strike against allied forces. What we witness are emerging ‘failed provinces’ and collapsed Pakistani state authority in the tribal areas.

Allied efforts to save Afghanistan from sliding into anarchy again needs stronger and sustained military efforts, the fusion of ISAF with the operation Enduring Freedom, stronger financial support for reconstruction, increased pressure on the Karzai government to deal with corruption and inefficient governance.

What is most important, however, is strong pressure on the Pakistani government to dealwith terrorist camps in their North-western provinces. Musharraf ought to be threatened with allied air strikes on Pakistani territory if Pakistani forces are not willing to deal with the problem themselves. For sure, this would mean a serious potential for destabilization of Pakistan. But doesn’t this indicate that the preconditions of military victory are undermined by political constraints?

If the battle for Afghanistan were to be lost, allied credibility will be wrecked and terrorist threats to allied countries will be dramatically on the rise. Allied military action against the rogue Pakistani provinces should therefore be seriously considered. This, however, will be difficult to be sold to war-wary domestic audiences. The military fight against terror is on the verge of being lost not only on the battleground, with the nations liberated – both the Iraqi and the Afghan people – but at the home front as well.

Allied societies and elites hoewever need to realize, that we are in a serious clash for civilization with backward societies and cultures. The dilemma of this fight is, that we are forced to make compromises with moderate elements of backward polities and cultures in order to make our defence of enlightened and human values feasible.

Rüstung-Proliferation

Der nukleare Dammbruch

December 5, 2006 Gerhard_Mangott 9 Comments

Die Versuche, die Verbreitung militärisch-nuklearen Wissens und dessen Nutzung zum Bau nuklearer Sprengkörper durch rechtliche Barrieren − das Nichtverbreitungsregime NPT 1970/1995 − aufzuhalten, kann als gescheitert angesehen werden. Zwar wurden die atomaren Diffusionsprozesse verlangsamt, aber die Dämme drohen nunmehr zu brechen. Das militärische Arsenal Nordkoreas und die mutmassliche militärische Nuklearoption Irans werden vermutlich regionale nukleare Rüstungswettläufe auslösen, aus denen nahezu zwanzig Nuklearstaaten entstehen werden.

Die militärische counter-proliferation als alternativer Schutzmechanismus gegen nukleare Aufrüstung neuer Staaten stösst in vielen Fällen an enge Grenzen: unbekannte, unterirdische oder verbunkerte nukleare Anreicherungs- und Wiederaufbereitungsganlagen, militärische Eskalationsgefahren konventioneller und nuklearer Art zählen zu den vorrangigen militärischen Risiken und Schwächen. Präzisionsschläge gegen bekannte Ziele zerstören nicht das nukleartechnische Wissen und können den Nuklearisierungsprozeß daher lediglich verzögern. Die nukleare Entwaffnung − die Zerstörung von nuklearen Fähigkeiten (capabilities) − ist ohne die Änderung des Regimes und damit seiner Absichten (intentions) nutzlos. Militärische Gegenproliferation muss daher immer den Regimewechsel als ultimatives politisches Ziel enthalten − wenn es nicht nur um letztlich unsicheren Zeitgewinn gehen soll. Regimewechsel, die in vielen Fällen massive militärische Bodenoperationen mit kosten- und zeitintensiven Stabilisierungsaufgaben einfordern, überdehnen aber verfügbare westliche Ressourcen.

Der Erwerb eines militärischen Nukleararsenals durch einen neuen Staat verändert jedenfalls die strategische Lage aller angrenzenden Staaten. Diesen stehen letztlich nur zwei Optionen offen, darauf zu reagieren − selber nuklear militärisch aufzurüsten oder aber unter den nuklearen Schutzschirm der bestehenden Nuklearmächte einzutreten.

Die letzte Option ist nicht in allen Fällen bedingungslos möglich und politisch unsicher. Wie die Abkehr der USA von der Strategie der massiven Vergeltung innerhalb der NATO intensive Debatten über das amerikanische commitment zur nuklearen Verteidigung des westlichen Europa auslöste, können die Anrainerstaaten neuer nuklearer Mächte auch nicht sicher auf den nuklearen Schutzschirm anderer Staaten, allen voran der USA, zählen.

Die Logik der neuen strategischen Lage bei vorhandenen technischen Kenntnissen und den materiellen Voraussetzungen zum Bau nuklearer Waffen (hochangereichertes Uran, Plutonium) ist für die Anrainerstaaten neuer Nuklearmächte angesichts nicht ausreichend funktionsfähiger Raketenabwehrsysteme die atomare Selbstaufrüstung.

Der Dammbruch im Nichtverbreitungsregime wird damit nahezu unweigerlich zur Proliferation nuklearer Waffen in grossem Masstab führen. Das westliche Interesse bedarf daher einer grundsätzlichen Revision: Nachdem die Verbreitung nuklearer Waffen nicht mehr zu verhindern ist, muss die nukleare Bewaffnung jener Staaten gefördert werden, die den westlichen Interessen- und Wertekanon teilen. Die Förderung nuklear bewaffneter Bündnispartner ist eine logische Folge einer grundsätzlichen Erkenntis: nicht die nuklearen militärischen Fähigkeiten eines Regimes sind die zentrale Gefahr, sondern die Absichten eines derart bewaffneten Regimes. Nukleare Waffen im Arsenal feindseliger, internationale Normen brechender, nach innen repressiver und grundsätzlich nach aussen aggressiver Terrorstaaten sind eine massive Bedrohung. Wenn diese Entwicklung aber weder rechtlich noch militärisch einzuhegen ist, bleibt als strategische Konsequenz nur die nukleare Aufrüstung der Staaten übrig, deren Absichten defensiv und mit den Interessen des Westens vereinbar sind und die über rechtsstaatlich-demokratische Mindeststandards verfügen. Die nukleare Bewaffnung befreundeter Regime verstärkt die Verteidigungskraft gegen nuklear bewaffnete Feindstaaten und − wenn die strategische Kultur der nuklearen Abschreckung als erlern- und nachahmbar angesehen wird − auch die Sicherheit der liberalen Demokratien. Zugleich ist die nukleare Abrüstung der offziellen (westlichen) Nuklearmächte derzeit als sicherheitsgefährdend anzusehen. Wenn die Staatenwelt nicht nuklearfrei sein kann, dann muss sie voll von Nuklearwaffen sein.

Diese Kommentar ist in der Zeitung ‘Die Presse’ am 5. Dezember 2006 exklusiv erschienen.