John Mearsheimer und Stephen Walt haben in ihrem viel beachteten, wenn auch umstrittenen Buch ‚The Israel Lobby‘ (2007) deutlich gemacht, wie sehr jüdische Interessenverbände, allen voran das American-Israel Public Affairs Commitee (AIPAC), die Außenpolitik der USA zu beeinflussen vermögen. Dieses Lager sei imstande, strategische Entscheidungen der USA im Nahen und Mittleren Osten zu erwirken, die Staats- und Sicherheitsinteressen Israels dienlich sind, aber zentrale Interessen der USA verletzten. Das nationale Interesse der USA werde dadurch in Geiselhaft der Interessen Israels genommen. Mearsheimer und Walt sind – dies gilt es zu beachten – renommierte Experten an der Harvard University und an der University of Chicago und keine antisemitischen oder antiisraelischen Hassredner.

Das von jüdischen Verbänden beharrlich vorgetragene Narrativ von der Bedrohung der israelischen staatlichen Existenz durch eine Koalition regionaler Widersacher, die den Schutz durch externe Mächte, allen voran der USA, erfordere, zählt zu den die Interessen der USA nachhaltigst verletzenden und beeinträchtigenden Faktoren. Die Bindung amerikanischer Nahostpolitik an die derart definierten Sicherheitsinteressen Israels sind ein wesentlicher Faktor für den Legitimitäts- und Ansehensverlust der USA im Nahen Osten.

Iraq is not about democracy. Despite democratic globalist’s emphasis on US moral obligations to spread democracy globally even by military means it is time to return to a realist perspective and start defending US and allied powers’ vital interests. Democracy does not work in current Iraq and democratizing this country should have never been of any concern to the US. Had realist motivations prevailed in 2003 the US would never have intervened in Iraq militarily in the first place.

However, it is idle to lament on the Bush-43 decision to wage this war of choice back in 2003. The only thing that counts now is how to entangle allied forced from the Iraqi quagmire resulting both from a terrorist insurgency and a sectarian civil war. In both these processes external powers like Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are deeply involved. The Shiite led Maliki government is both unable and unwilling to reign in the Shiite militias (particularly those of Muqtada Sadr, on which his government currently depends). Maliki’s commitment to reconciliation is weak; it is even questionable if he really supports the idea of a multisectarian Iraq. Shiite dominance may be more to his liking; US military control is therefore considered hampering these efforts. Sunni engagement in Iraqi politics therefore is highly limited and even if Maliki’s efforts were more serious it is highly unlikely that most of the Sunni tribes could be engaged in a viable coalition government.

Reconstruction of the Iraqi economy and infrastructure is slow. This is due to incompetence, corruption, poor planning and the fact that many countries do not live up to the financial committments for rebuilding war-torn Iraq they had previously made.

On the face of it, it seems prudent to withdraw allied forces from Iraq. The inevitable consequence however would be an escalating sectarian struggle, an all-out civil war forcing or inviting neighbouring countries to back the warring parties; central government would collapse, the country most likely disintegrate and Iraq’s neighbours occupy parts of the collapsing Iraq. This would however not end in an equilibrium with the invaders saturated with parts of Iraqi territory but would lead to military clashes between the invading armies.

Furthermore a dismembering Iraq would boost islamist terrorist activity of the al-Khaida type. Both an escalating war in the region and the formation of terrorist cells gaining sufficient strength to wage terrorist attacks against allied countries directly threaten vital security interests of the US and its allies. Withdrawing from Iraq is not like leaving Saigon; it would be like abandoning the decision to invade the Normandie in 1944.

The allies therefore must not leave. A surge of armed forces is a highly reasonable decision albeit coming excessively late. However, the reinforcement numbers suggested by President Bush are far too low. With the US army already overstretched realist thinking should urge reluctant European governments to assist the allied powers with additional military reinforcements. Clearing and holding section by section in Baghdad making use of overwhelming numbers of troops is of utmost importance.

This surge however needs to be combined with massive investment to boost economic rebuilding; economic recovery is aimed to provide the ordinary Iraqis with jobs in order to decrease their hostility toward the allied forces.

Widely discussed benchmarks for the Maliki government will most likely not work as it becomes increasingly clear that the Shiite groups stand to profit from a US withdrawal. Allied powers need to dump Maliki and press for a different government – a moderate coalition of Shiites, Sunni and Kurds. This needs to be pursued even if it meant violating the existing constitution or dissolving parliament.

Allied forces should stop democratising Iraq but stabilise and control all the levers of power. The Iraqi quagmire does not call for democracy but for occupation, leadership and military control combined with concerted rebuilding efforts. If the people of Iraq are not able to govern, sustain and defend their country as ‘Iraqis’, external interference is more than necessary. Granting power to one sect tempts it to wield unlimited power. Keeping Sunnis and Shiite off power might cause them reconsider their situation. If prolonged occupation by foreign forces and UN civil administration within the framework of an UN protectorate might foster an Iraqi identity and desire to regain freedom for all Iraqi ethnic and religious groups this might be worth a try. If they stand to regain a rebuilt country political resentments may dwindle.

This is a task for many years and requires political and financial commitments by an allied coalition far larger than the current one. This war is not about winning; this war is about not to lose. Allied powers simply can’t afford to lose.

With the US tied down in the Iraqi quagmire, leftist intellectuals urge the US to abandon allegedly neocon unilateralism and return to concepts of multilateralism. Multilateralism is praised as a panacea for handling failing states, terrorism or proliferation. The op-eds are full with multilateral recipes for handling crises in all corners of the globe.

Those advocates however hardly ever define what they mean by multilateralism. Does their multilateralism call for consensus among the P-5, the veto-holding powers in the SC of the UN, as a noble principle or even force the US to achieving agreement among the P-5 at all cost? What this approach leads to has been illustrated most recently by the disastrous resolution on the Iranian nuclear programme adopted by the Security Council last week. After months of negotiating and back-pedaling, the US, the UK and France have agreed to resolution 1737 (2006) which will by all means will turn out to be utterly ineffective. Russian and Chinese balking resulted in a watered-down version which only causes laughter in Teheran. For the boasted purpose of preserving unanimity, the US and its European allies have accepted a meaningless compromise capable neither of dealing with the perseverant unanimity within the ranks of the veto powers, nor – more importantly – of addressing the Iranian menace in an appropriate manner.

Should multilateralism therefore mean aiming for widespread consensus outside of the framework of the SC? Well, the author is inclined to support such an alternative for the sake of effective approaches to handling threatening crises. But this is precisely not what the champions of effective multilateralism both in the EU and US congress like to adhere to, at least publicly. Yet these hypocritical advocates of international law tend to forget that only in 1999 many of them had supported the NATO air war against the FR of Yugoslavia, which – as we all know – was not authorized by the UN. So sometimes it obviously seems appropriate also for these multilateralists to abandon SC consensus for the sake of achieving humanitarian or interest-based outcomes in conflict cases. While I consider it right to sack legality for the sake of legitimacy in some cases, the multilateralists try hard to conceal their collusion with this approach back in 1999.

But even if we were to subscribe to multilateralism and inclined to urge the US to return to multilateralist approaches to international crises we have to answer one crucial question: Are there any reliable European partners for multilateral bargains with the US except for the UK? France, Germany and Russia have all rejected US calls for support and help in dealing with the Iraqi crisis in 2002/2003. Even if we were to concede that the military intervention by the US and the UK in Iraq in 2003 was wrong, even if we were to agree that the planning for post-war rebuilding and re-organising Iraq have been utterly simplistic, there is one thing western powers have to agree too: it is in our vital interests to stabilise Iraq. We must not accept the dismemberment of Iraq which will end in a broad military conflict in the entire region. Europe and the US need an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself.

Most EU countries however prefer to sit on the fences and bark at the US; self-opinionated as they are, countries like Germany and France prefer to stick to the ‘we told you so’-position while irresponsibly denying any substantial help for the military stabilisation and the civil reconstruction of Iraq.

Multilateralism is indeed a valuable concept though not as the legalist construct of P-5 consensus. Relying on multilateralist approaches to international crises however requires leadership – which the US is to provide – and reliable partners. Most European countries do not live up to this at the moment. At the end of the day, the European mantra seems to be: We expect the US to lead and take the burden, and we will tell her when and where… and, by the way, don’t ask the EU to contribute to the effort militarily, she enjoys her peace dividend…

A commentary based on these arguments was published in German language exclusively by the Austrian Daily ‘Der Standard’ on December 30th, 2006:

Joschka Fischer mahnt also die Rückkehr der USA zum Multilateralismus an. Leider erklärt er nie, was er darunter versteht. Bedeutet Multilateralismus die Einbindung der hegemonialen Macht in den Konsens der kollektiven Ordnung der Vereinten Nationen? Meint Joschka Fischer denn, die USA sollten sich durch die Vetomächte des Sicherheitsrates – allen voran Rußland und China – einhegen lassen? Die jüngsten Fehlgeburten dieses Rates sind die zahnlosen Sanktionen gegen das islamistische Regime des Iran. Um den Eindruck des kollektiven, d.h. multilateralen Vorgehens, die auch von Fischer beschworene Geschlossenheit der internationalen Gemeinschaft zu bewahren, wurden substantielle Sanktionen unterlassen; der Multilateralismus hat ein dürres Gerippe an Verhaltensregeln ausgespuckt, das die Nuklearoption des reaktionären iranischen Regimes nicht verhindern wird.

Erstaunlich aber, sollte Fischer wirklich diesen Multilateralismus der VN einmahnen. Erinnerlich noch ist, als Deutschland unter Schröder und Fischer die – an sich richtige – NATO-Intervention im Kosovo unterstützten, die doch den völkerrechtlichen Multilateralismus des zwingend gebotenen Sicherheitsratsmandates verletzte. Sollten also nicht alle Vetomächte des Sicherheitsrates der VN zustimmen müssen, damit das heilige Prinzip des Multilateralismus gewahrt bleibt? Plädiert Fischer damit für den Multilateralismus weniger Staaten, der sich im Völkerrechtsgewand kleidet, wenn er den eigenen Interessen dient? Muss sich eine Staatenkoalition dem Völkerrecht nicht beugen, sobald sie glaubt, moralisch rechtens oder im zwingenden eigenen Interesse zu handeln? Wieder hätte Fischer damit recht, allein die Botschaft wäre ihm wohl unangenehm.

Und schließlich: ein solcherart verstandener Multilateralismus, der die Zusammenarbeit führender Mächte zur Lösung einer Gefahr auch jenseits des Mandats des Sicherheitsrates einschließt, ist stumpf, wenn die Bereitschaft der großen Staaten ausbleibt, unter der Führung der USA (die Fischer auch immer wieder anerkennt und geradezu einfordert) zusammenzuarbeiten. Multilateralismus braucht Partner. Die europäischen Partner haben sich aber gerade in der Irakkrise 2002/03 verweigert. Sie verweigern sich auch jetzt noch: Was immer man über die Richtigkeit der Entscheidung zur militärischen Intervention 2003 denken mag; was immer an der nicht ausreichenden Planung der Nachkriegsordnung auszusetzen ist; eines ist sicher: die Niederlage der USA im Irak und der Abzug der US-Streitkräfte aus dem Zweistromland würden die Region in eine verheerende Krise stürzen, die unmittelbar vitalste westliche, d.h. auch europäische Interessen erschütterte. Trotzdem bleiben die meisten europäischen Staaten auf der Zuschauertribüne und sonnen sich lieber in historischer Rechthaberei, als konkret zur Lösung der irakischen Zwangslage beizutragen. Multilateralismus ist ein taugliches Konzept – aber er braucht Partner. Führungsleistung einzumahnen, ohne zur Gefolgschaft bereit zu sein, ist nicht genug.

Strong US leadership should reject both ‘cut and run’ suggestions and ‘graceful exit’ recommendations. The US and its allies stand to lose strongly by the dismemberment of Iraq as this would invite or press neighbouring countries to intervene. An indirect, let alone a direct, confrontation in Iraq between Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran to get control of parts of Iraq is a scenario much too dangerous to western interests.

Europe needs to understand that the US must not lose in Iraq in order to forestall disastrous consequences for western interests. European allies – except for the UK – however lack courage, leadership and resoluteness to commit military forces and financial support for the stabilisation of Iraq. It is highly important to bolster western military presence in Iraq. This can not be done by the US military alone. US need European troops to help. If Europe does not respond it fails to understand its own vital interests.

Furthermore, it is futile to set strict and public benchmarks for the Maliki government. It is highly necessary to push Maliki to do a better job as Iraq’s leader, but not in public. It is, in addition, illusionary however, to expect the current Iraqi government to deliver results in due time and meet western expectations. It is far too weak for meeting these expectations.

Iraq needs more Western troops and increased financial commitments to rebuild the country. The true danger is, that the US is following the European lack of responsibility and opts for an allegedly graceful exit which is nothing more than the abandonment of vital security interests, the wrecking of western credibility and a major defeat in the military struggle against terrorism.