{"id":332,"date":"2008-08-08T13:44:13","date_gmt":"2008-08-08T12:44:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/?p=332"},"modified":"2014-05-01T15:26:25","modified_gmt":"2014-05-01T13:26:25","slug":"krieg-im-sudkaukasus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/?p=332","title":{"rendered":"War in the South Caucasus &#8211; Krieg im S\u00fcdkaukasus"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft\" src=\"http:\/\/www.eichhorn.ws\/assets\/images\/suchoi_su_24_fencer.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"172\" height=\"140\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">&#8220;With the military situation in South Ossetia still murky, some initial assessments of the eruption of violent conflict can still be made:<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The military escalation at this point is exclusively in Georgia&#8217;s interest. Russia&#8217;s strategic interests had been the maintenance of the status-quo, as it had met all of Russia&#8217;s objectives. Thus it can be assumed that the military escalation of the past night was initiated by Georgia. Georgia&#8217;s president Saakashvili has declared the &#8220;restoration of the constitutional Order&#8221; as the strategic goal of the military operation. In so far, the Georgian side can only halt the military operations after that goal has been achieved, unless Saakashvili was to lose his face.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Russia on the other hand at the current escalation level had no other choice but to retaliate against the Georgian units by military means. Trained by US military advisors since 2002 and with Georgia\u2018s military budget to a very large extent financed by the US, the Georgian forces now make up about 35.000 soldiers. Many Georgian units have also obtained combat experience during their deployment in Iraq. These well-trained and well-equipped soldiers would have been able to overrun Ossetian militias. The collapse of the South Ossetian secession under Georgian military aggression was all but certain. As Russia had committed itself to the role as a guarantor of security in Ossetia, a military defeat of the South Ossetians as a result of Russian inactivity in the face of Georgia\u2019s military assault, would have been a major loss of face for Russia; Russia&#8217;s credibility would have been damaged not just in the Georgian secession areas, but as a stability proliferator in the wider Caspian area.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">What is more, Georgia&#8217;s military victory in South Ossetia would have strengthened Saakashvili&#8217;s position domestically (which had been eroded due to his political repression of the opposition and the social disillusionment) which in turn would most likely have made a military escalation against Abkhazia more likely in the months to come.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">At this stage of the conflict, it can be expected that the Russian leadership will pursue a limited operation of returning to the status-quo-ante by sending additional troops to Georgia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">As a result of the current fighting the secession conflict has turned from an intra-state issue to an inter-state war. This is a radical change of the overall strategic constellation. With Georgia in a full-scale military conflict with Russia, Georgia\u2019s further integration into the NATO can be ruled out for the foreseeable future. Although &#8211; perhaps it was the very ambition of Saakashvili to lead Georgia into NATO in due time caused him to launch the military assault. So far, Georgia\u2019s rapprochement with NATO was blocked by the unsolved secession conflicts. His calculation could therefore well have been to crush the secession movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to pave the way for obtaining a Membership Action Plan with NATO at the alliance&#8217;s foreign ministers\u2018 meeting in December.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong><br \/>\nGerman version<\/strong>:<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Auch wenn die milit\u00e4rische Lage in S\u00fcsoesstien un\u00fcbersichtlich ist, lassen sich doch erste Bewertungen vornehmen: Die milit\u00e4rische Eskalation ist ausschliesslich in georgischem Interesse. Russlands strategische Ziele waren auf die Bewahrung des status-quo ausgerichtet. Insofern ist davon auszugehen, dass die milit\u00e4rische Eskalation in der vergangenen Nacht auf georgische Initiative zur\u00fcckgeht.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Georgiens Pr\u00e4sident Saakashvili hat als strategisches Ziel der Milit\u00e4roperation die \u201aWiederherstellung der Verfassungsordnung\u2018 erkl\u00e4rt. Insofern kann die georgische Seite ihre milit\u00e4rischen Handlungen nur unter Gesichtsverlust Saakashvilis einstellen, bevor dieses Ziel erreicht ist. Russland hat(te) in der gegenw\u00e4rtigen Eskalationsstufe keine andere Wahl als milit\u00e4risch gegen die georgischen Einheiten vorzugehen. Die von Milit\u00e4rberatern der USA trainierten und die aus einem durch die USA weitgehend finanzierten Milit\u00e4rhaushalt ausger\u00fcsteten Streitkr\u00e4fte Georgiens (ca. 35.000 Soldaten), die auch durch ihren Kriseneinsatz im Irak kampferprobt sind, w\u00e4ren in der Lage, die s\u00fcdossetischen paramilit\u00e4rischen Verb\u00e4nde niederzuringen. Der Kollaps der s\u00fcdossetischen Sezession als Ergebnis russl\u00e4ndischer Unt\u00e4tigkeit w\u00e4re nicht nur ein Gesichtsverlust Russlands, sondern auch ein erheblicher strategischer Verlust. Die Glaubw\u00fcrdigkeit Russlands w\u00e4re nicht nur in den georgischen Sezessionsgebieten, sonden auch als Ordnungmacht in der zentralasiatischen Region besch\u00e4digt. Au\u00dferdem w\u00fcrde es die Position Saakashvilis in Georgien zementieren und die milit\u00e4rische Eskalation gegen Abchasien in einigen Monaten wahrscheinlicher machen.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Gleichwohl verfolgt die russl\u00e4ndische F\u00fchrung mit der Entsendung russl\u00e4ndischer Milit\u00e4reinheiten von russl\u00e4ndischem Staatsgebiet nur eine Minimalvariante \u2013 die Wiederherstellung des status quo ante.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Durch die Kampfhandlungen wurde der Konflikt von einer formal innerstaatlichen Auseinandersetzung zu einem zwischenstaatlichen Krieg. Dies stellt eine radikale \u00c4nderung der Lage dar. Mit Russland als Kriegsgegner Georgiens ist eine Integration Georgiens in die NATO auf absehbare Zeit g\u00e4nzlich ausgeschlossen. Vielleicht hat aber gerade die NATO-Ambition Saakashvilis die georgische Milit\u00e4raktion ausgel\u00f6st, weiss Saakashvili doch, dass die L\u00f6sung der Sezessionskonflikte in Abchasien und S\u00fcdossetien Georgiens Chancen deutlich erh\u00f6hen w\u00fcrde, auf dem Au\u00dfenministertreffen der NATO im Dezember d.J. den &#8216;Membership Action Plan&#8217; gew\u00e4hrt zu bekommen.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span class=\"wp-caption-dd\">Dieser Kommentar ist soeben auf der website der Tageszeitung &#8216;<a href=\"http:\/\/derstandard.at\/?url=\/?id=1216918883825\">Der Standard<\/a>&#8216; erschienen.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span class=\"wp-caption-dd\">Foto: www.eichhorn.ws<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&#8220;With the military situation in South Ossetia still murky, some initial assessments of the eruption of violent conflict can still be made: The military escalation at this point is exclusively in Georgia&#8217;s interest. Russia&#8217;s strategic interests had been the maintenance of the status-quo, as it had met all of Russia&#8217;s objectives. Thus it can be &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/?p=332\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">War in the South Caucasus &#8211; Krieg im S\u00fcdkaukasus<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-332","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-russia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/332","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=332"}],"version-history":[{"count":31,"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/332\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3183,"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/332\/revisions\/3183"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=332"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=332"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gerhard-mangott.at\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=332"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}